Standardisation, diversity and enlightenment in the contemporary crisis of EU language policy

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Introduction

Contemporary EU multilingualism policy is in something of a crisis at the moment. The 2008 Final Report\(^1\) of the High-Level Group on Multilingualism, a group of eleven senior European academics convened in 2006, spells out some of the reasons (these are their bullet-points):

- the enlargements in 2004 and 2007, whereby the number of Member States has increased from 15 to 27;
- increasing recognition and seizure, by individuals and organisations, of opportunities provided by the Single Market, notably increasing trans-European trade, and mobility of workers;
- globalisation and internationalisation in many fields of human activity;
- revitalisation of regions within Member States, and of cross-border regions;
- migration into the Union—to the extent that practically all the Member States are now migration countries;
- rampant developments in ICT, facilitating, among other things, instant communication from any place in the world to any other;
- creation of a European higher education and research area, including increasing student mobility;
- changing job profiles and increasing mobility between jobs;
- advent of global tourism.

For the authors of the Report, these developments “partly reflect contradictory trends—for example, globalization vs. decentralization.” But, they argue, the “trends in language learning and language use reveal contradictory patterns” in an even more heightened way: “preference for English as a lingua franca vs. revival of regional or minority languages; emphasis on the world-wide value of specific languages (Bengali, English, Hindi, Japanese, Mandarin Chinese, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish) vs. emphasis on the community value of ‘small’ languages” (8).

I will argue here that these contradictions are only apparent—that a preference for English as a lingua franca in fact goes together with an interest in the revival of regional or minority languages, that awareness of the world-wide value of languages like Bengali, English, Hindi, Japanese, etc., in fact goes together with an appreciation of the “community value of ‘small’ languages.” Why the High Level Group on Multilingualism ultimately failed to articulate something so blindingly obvious now becomes the interesting fact in need of an explanation.

Policy documents provide a privileged form of access to the way that EU

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policymakers are thinking about these issues—provided that we read the documents on two levels: attending both to what EU officials say about language, and to the language they use in saying it. Doing this makes it clear that this most recent (and ongoing) phase of EU multilingualism policy is in fact a project of language standardization. It differs, of course, from earlier and more familiar language standardization efforts in that it attempts to encompass a multiplicity of languages—the 23 official and working languages of the 27 EU Member States, as well as the 60+ “regional or minority” (and/or “lesser-used”) languages, plus the languages of migrants from outside the EU, plus English.

But in their effort to render the sociolinguistic diversity of contemporary Europe amenable to managerial expertise, I shall argue that policymakers in the European Commission continue to view sociolinguistic diversity through the lens provided by an inherited dichotomy between two forms of value associated with—and generated by the use of—languages. One is the emblematic value of mother-tongues as symbols of historically distinct cultural traditions (latterly, of ethnonational or ethnic identities); the other is the utilitarian value of English and other “vehicular languages” as mere denotational “tools” of (international) commerce, knowledge of which is more often likened to “digital literacy” and other portable skills enabling participation in a flexible labour market than to any particular modality of cultural belonging.²

The dichotomy is familiar, because it is an inheritance from the post-Enlightenment project of ethnolinguistic nation-statehood in Europe—a project founded, as Silverstein shows, on “the logocentric notion that efficiency in coming to political like-mindedness is only possible in that unique language that mediates the transduction of society into polity” (Silverstein 2010: 351-352). This, then, is a “logocratic theory of society-as-polity” that “presumes upon the unilingual language community”—never mind the fact that “the plurilingual speech community” is and has always been the most common actual state of sociolinguistic affairs (ibid., p. 353; emphasis in orig.). The resolution of this dichotomy in and by the Standard language, indeed, has been the conceptual foundation of all European—and many non-European—projects of language standardization.

But if past projects of language standardization have been based on the idea that the Standard language of the logocratic society-as-polity represents the synthesis or fusion of these two purportedly fundamental and self-evident forms of value- and authority-in-language, contemporary policymakers are attempting to manage the current crisis of linguistic diversity in Europe in a new way. As we will see, the current effort at top-down management of societal plurilingualism in contemporary Europe attempts to convert this underlying duality of symbolic vs. instrumental legitimacy into a three-way distinction, resolving the problem of societal plurilingualism by an intervention into the relationship between the individual polyglot speaker and the elements of his or her linguistic repertoire, distributing these two sources of linguistic value among the three languages that comprise that repertoire: the speaker’s Mother Tongue (MT), his or her Personal Adoptive Language (PAL), and a “vehicular language” of international communication.

To develop my argument I want first to examine a set of recent (2006-present) EU/EC documents that explicitly address European multilingualism, to see how officialdom understands the basic categories involved:

- What is “a language,” such that, relevant to different kinds of framings, the multiplicity of languages is seen as a problem (‘challenge’), but the diversity of languages is seen as a form of inherited wealth?

² See, e.g., the distinction between “exemplarist” and “standardist” ideologies in Indonesia, as described by Errington (2000); and cf. Silverstein 1987, Gal 2006, Woolard 2008 and refs. therein.
• How is the relationship between societal plurilingualism and individual polyglottism conceptualized?

• To what extent are official understandings about the relationship between languages, political communities, and individual speakers (and groups of speakers) informed by recent sociolinguistic and other literature on European multilingualism?

Second, I want to look at these official texts about language as themselves acts of using language, not merely to lampoon bureaucracy-speak, but rather to identify how conventionalized ways of speaking about the ‘challenges’ (costs) and ‘rewards’ (benefits) of multilingualism circulate via texts emanating from different EU/EC institutions, projects, frameworks, and initiatives. All of these texts—which after all are themselves meant to be “interventions” into the phenomena they describe—serve as the expression of an official culture of language, helping to shape the concrete ways that political figures and policymakers work through problems and contradictions.

Through a “close reading” of a selected set of policy documents, I hope to show how EU multilingualism policy responds to broader concerns about the “management” of migration and the policing of boundaries in the EU. When and how, in these documents, are differences among languages seen as barriers to communication—and thereby as potential threats to the stability of European civil society? When, on the other hand, are they seen as valuable aspects of a fragile linguistic “ecology” in need of protection and preservation? How, in discussions of language difference and diversity, are populations of speakers imagined and given a phantom objectivity? How do “facts” about language “diversity” become the basis for carving out new groupings and populations, which then become a reality to be lived as a target of and problems for managerial thinking?

This paper is divided into three sections. The issue of “vehicular languages” provides a convenient point of entry, in the first section, into EU multilingualism policy, partly because it is probably the most significant single unresolved language policy issue facing the EU at the moment (2009). In one rather reductive sense the question boils down to whether the institutions of the EU should recognize (and grant some form of “official” status to) the presence in Europe of English as a lingua franca—but if so, how? If not, why not? In fact the question is a productive one to explore because the anxieties it evokes are so far-reaching: from the (mutually) ambivalent relationship between continental Europe and the Anglophone UK, Ireland, and the US, to the politics of translation, to a muted sense of alarm about the immersion of European young people in Anglophone mass popular culture via the continually new technologies that allow them to share, and deepen their immersion, in it.

The second section of the paper offers a close reading of an important 2008 document that sets out a somewhat idealized view of the model citizen of a plurilingual Europe of the future. This person has full fluency and literacy in three languages: first, in his or her own “mother tongue” (MT); second, in the (standardized, official) language of another EU member state or community (termed a “Personal Adoptive Language”); and third, in a “language of international communication” as a lingua franca.

Similar kinds of “three-language formulas” have been proposed and/or implemented in a number of societies, most notably in India (at the behest of Jawaharlal Nehru—see Aggarwal 1991, Brass 1975, and refs. therein) and Africa (see Laitin 1991, 1992, and see the critical response of Akinnaso 1994; see Fishman 1999: 90ff for an overview, and Ferguson

3 In this paper I am concerned primarily with policy documents emanating from the European Commission (EC) and its subsidiary organizations, institutions, and projects. To address systematically the many contrasts between projects undertaken under the auspices of the Council of Europe and those of the European Commission would reveal important fault lines within and between these major EU institutions; unfortunately, these cannot be adequately addressed here for reasons of space.
One important difference between these earlier attempts at top-down management of societal plurilingualism through the use of three-language formulas and the material discussed here is that contemporary EU multilingualism policy introduces a new distinction that cuts across the inherited distinction between *emblematic* and *instrumental* value: what defines the Personal Adoptive Languages (PALs) in contemporary EU policy is that they are determined by the *choice* made by private individuals, as liberal subjects in a (European) marketplace of languages. This actually puts PALs into a contrast both with “vehicular languages” of international communication like English, and with symbolically-freighted languages “of identity.” Both of these latter categories of language are defined precisely by a lack of choice: English because it is the language of the market, finance, the internet, and other inescapable parts of modern life; one’s Mother Tongue, because it is the language of one’s people, one’s essence, one’s history. Both “vehicular” languages—seen as tied to no particular cultural or national heritage—and “mother tongues,” then, contrast with the private, optional, free, Personal Adoptive Languages that (as we will see below) are expected to save the day.

The third section of the paper ventures onto what is by now very well-traveled ground in the literature of linguistic anthropology, sociolinguistics, and related fields: the ideologies that underwrite state projects of language standardization. It is argued that in the materials surveyed here one can discern the next phase in an ongoing European project of language standardization—the application to multiple languages, to a multilingual polity, and to its polyglot citizens as individuals of the fundamental dichotomy that underwrites all projects of language standardization: a radical distinction between *symbolic* value and *instrumental* value, now cross-cut by the contrast just mentioned between two ways of thinking about the relationship between an individual polyglot speaker and the elements of his or her linguistic repertoire, between *private*, freely chosen, “personal” languages, and *public*, compulsory, in some sense coercive ones. Findings are summarized and alternative directions for research are briefly envisioned in a conclusion.

**Vehicular languages**

Within the EU and its constituent bodies, anxieties about vehicular languages—also known in the literature as *lingua francas* (more properly, *lingue franche*)—emerge from a context of growing apprehension about the relationship between the obvious (and increasing) multilingualism of European societies and institutions, and the very meaning of European national and trans-national citizenship and modes of governmentality. These concerns touch upon matters ranging from the transcendent—the “European project” as one based on “unity through diversity” and rooted in Enlightenment ideas of nationhood and peoplehood—to the practical—management of document flows and communication within and between EC institutions, for example.

Almost no one involved in these discussions denies the growing pervasiveness of English, and to varying, but lesser degrees, French, German, and Spanish, as *lingua francas* in contemporary Europe; the most pressing unresolved policy question is rather whether or not the status of English—or any of the other possible or potential vehicular languages (e.g.,

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4 Laitin (1992) proposes a detailed, flexible three-language formula for language rationalization in Africa but is criticized for assuming that language planning and language behavior can be captured by a framework drawn from economic planning, for a top-down approach that regards government as the sole source of language policies, and for regarding language outcomes as predictable” (Fishman 1999: 99).
7. Why not adopt a single official language for the European Union?

Because it would cut off most people in the EU from an understanding of what the EU was doing. Whichever language were chosen for such a role, most EU citizens would not understand it well enough to comply with its laws or avail themselves of their rights, or be able to express themselves in it well enough to play any part in EU affairs. And which language would you choose? The EU language with the largest number of native speakers is German. But it is not widely used outside Germany and Austria. The EU languages with the largest number of native speakers in the world are Spanish and Portuguese but most of those speakers are not in Europe. French is the official language, or one of the official languages, of three Member States, it is spoken in many parts of the world and taught in many EU schools: but it is much more widely known in southern and western Europe than in the north or east of the continent. Of the EU languages, English is the most widely known as either the first or second language in the EU: but recent surveys show that still fewer than half the EU population have any usable knowledge of it.

Official terminology provides an important clue. First, as to “vehicular languages,” several terms appear to be used almost interchangeably in the materials surveyed: *vehicular language*; *lingua franca*; *language of international communication*; *language for general communication*; *instrument of global communication*; “a third language in which [speakers] lack fluency” ; *working language(s); communication language(s)*.

Such labels seem to stress the utility of English as a tool of mere communication, rather than its symbolic value as a vessel of unique cultural expression. A third possibility would be that a language like English can have “symbolic” value for its (already polyglot) speakers not because it is a mother-tongue tied to an ancestral culture, an inherited literature, and a fixed homeland, but rather, because it is both a vehicle for and a symbol of a kind of cosmopolitanism that comes from mobility itself. This does not seem to have been considered.

In a response to the comments offered in an online forum in which people were invited to answer the (somewhat leading) question “Why do you think it is important to learn languages?” EU Multilingualism Commissioner Leonard Orban made his own position clear; after a quick review of the bureaucratic procedure by which a language can become an official working language of the EU, he says, “this”—the procedure—“is one of the reasons that Esperanto cannot become the lingua franca of the EU”:

The second reason has to do with its specificity. A language like Esperanto has little social or cultural practice connected to its vocabulary […] The third reason is a more personal one: I do not believe in a lingua franca, be it Esperanto, Latin or …English.

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6 Itself a calque into French of the Arabic collocation *lisan-al-farang*, in which *farang* < *‘frank’*—a term that arose during the Crusades.

7 “A Rewarding Challenge” p XX; compare the definition offered by Schultze (1933) below.
On the other hand, [a] lingua franca is, historically, a spontaneous social linguistic phenomenon and is not the result of any legislative or political decision.  

In a speech given on 14 Sept 2007, Commissioner Orban was more specific:

[T]he title the organizers chose for my intervention—“towards a lingua franca of the Mediterranean?”—is so provocative that it allows me to go straight to the core of European policy on multilingualism. Without overlooking a series of remarks though. A first administrative one, so to say. Promoting a lingua franca is intrinsically against the Commission mandate: promoting linguistic diversity.

Noting that Phoenician, Greek, Latin, Arabic, etc., have all served in the past as “communication languages” in the Mediterranean region, Commissioner Orban returns to the point that “a lingua franca is born when people find a sense to it. It is the people who decide this. Whether the authorities like it or not”—an interesting historical aside, given that most of the pidgins and other langue franche familiar from the literature of sociolinguistics emerged in situations of cultural “contact” marked by the institutionalization of exploitative colonialism, asymmetric trade relations, and/or religious conversion by book and sword. Commissioner Orban closes with an ecological metaphor:

When it comes to the European Union, its task is not to favour or combat the communication languages: its task is, as an institution based on the defense of democracy, protection of the present linguistic environment, to consolidate each citizen’s right to communicate and make oneself understood in his or her mother tongue.  

The question, then, is: How do Commissioner Orban and others like him understand “the present linguistic environment” that they work to defend? The un-fitness of vehicular languages for official recognition and status is often explained (by Mr Orban and others) by appeal to their lack of connection to a cultural tradition(s), literature, etc., and hence, their lack of “identity,” i.e., of the capacity to serve speakers and communities as emblems of group membership—qualities that flow from the fact that they are often defined as “nobody’s Mother Tongue.”

One must, however, note the puzzle in the position staked out by the EC: Mr Orban sees an inherent conflict between “promoting [ny] lingua franca” and the mission of the EC, which is “promoting linguistic diversity”—and yet lingua francas have always and only arisen as “supplementary” communication media precisely in situations of linguistic diversity!

In any case, Mr Orban’s position—leaving Esperanto and other International, Auxiliary Languages (IALs) aside—is curiously at variance with views expressed by many mainstream sociolinguists over past decades, for whom Joshua Fishman can serve as a representative example:

10 Recall the definition offered by Schultze (1933) of what he called ‘substitute languages’ (Ersatzsprachen): “idioms which serve to bring about an incomplete understanding between men of different tongues”; Schultze envisioned his study as a contribution to the field he called Sprach- und Wanderungs-Soziologie, “The sociology of language and migration” (Schultze 1933: 378, Cited in Reinecke 1938).
Lingua francas in general are too powerful and so involved in myriad crucial affairs that it is highly unlikely that they can ever be regarded as totally neutral insofar as the real world is concerned. They always represent powers, interests and ideas and in their case it is a fact of life that even being uninvolved … is still tantamount to taking sides, if only because it impacts the two sides to any dispute differently (Fishman 1994: 69).

“Even being uninvolved is still tantamount to taking sides”—Fishman grasps part of the essential truth here. Indeed, Harvey (2003) in a review article contrasting the work of Phillipson (2000), Pennycook (2001), and Canagarajah (1999) makes a very similar point; Canagarajah in particular, she notes, emphasizes the fact that

English confers too many privileges in today’s world to ignore, so indigenous monolingualism is not a powerful option. Rather, there is an insistence that people remain linguistically and culturally part of their community while also learning and “mastering” the discourse of power (including that of Western/English academia). (Harvey 2003: 255)

Managing multilingual repertoires

In June 2007 the European Commission assembled a “group of personalities active in the area of culture … to advise them on the role multilingualism could play in regard to the intercultural dialogue and the mutual comprehension of the citizens of the European Union.” The report they produced was touted on other EU sites as “the first report to tackle … the link between linguistic and cultural diversity in Europe” (REF).

This group of ten was chaired by Amin Maalouf, a Lebanese-born novelist resident in Paris since 1971 and winner of the Prix Goncourt in 1993; M. Maalouf, whose mother was a Maronite Christian and whose father was Catholic, is also the author of the 2003 book In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong (Maalouf 2003). Other members included the President of the Goethe Institut, a Romanian communications consultant, an Italian-born expert on children’s law long resident in London, a Portuguese philosopher, the permanent secretary of the Belgian Royal Academy of French Language and Literature (Jacques de Decker), a former Minister for Education of the Czech Republic, a Danish novelist and filmmaker, and Tahar Ben Jelloun, a Moroccan-born psychotherapist and novelist living in France who received the Prix Goncourt in 1987.

In 2008 the “Group of Intellectuals” produced its report,11 which acknowledged at the outset “a strong temptation to tolerate a de facto situation in which a single language, English, would be dominant in the work of European institutions, in which two or three other languages would more or less manage to hold their own for a little longer, while the vast majority of our languages would have but a symbolic status”; such a turn of events “is not desirable. … It would also be contrary to the whole ethos of the European project” (4-5).

The spectre of ethnic and religious violence haunts the authors of the report, who point out that “A common sense of belonging based on linguistic and cultural diversity is a powerful antidote against the various types of fanaticism towards which all too often the assertion of identity has slipped in Europe and elsewhere, in previous years as today” (p. 5).

Of course, “linguistic and cultural diversity” need to be understood in a particular way if they are to serve as the basis for a “common sense of belonging.”

Assessing the needs of “those entering Europe”—a grouping which encompasses immigrants, citizens of new Member States, and children—they stress the need for EU institutions to inculcate “the desire to gain acquaintance with the common heritage and the desire to make their own contribution, too” (6-7).

The report emphasizes the importance of two ideas, “which are in fact the two sides of one proposal”: first, bilateral relations between the peoples of the EU, which “should hinge by way of priority on the languages of the two peoples involved rather than another language” [i.e., English] (p. 9). Second, they stress the importance of the idea of personal adoptive language, in accordance with what is known as “the Barcelona Objective” (promulgated at an EC meeting in 2002): “The idea is that every European should be encouraged to freely choose a distinctive language, different from his or her language of identity, and also different from his or her language of international communication” (10). The personal adoptive language, they stress, “would in no way be a second foreign language but, rather, a sort of second mother tongue” (id).

Indeed, the European Parliament on 24 March 2009, while sharply split over how and to what extent to support the teaching of regional or minority languages, reaffirmed the goal articulated here and in other documents, that “Europeans should speak their mother tongue plus two other languages, one for business and one for pleasure” (EurActiv 25 March 2009). Here is the fundamental dichotomy that organizes the language consciousness of EU officials and intellectuals: the dichotomy between symbolic and instrumental value:

By drawing a clear distinction, when the choice is made, between a language of international communication and a personal adoptive language, we would encourage Europeans to take two separate decisions when it comes to language learning, one dictated by the needs of the broadest possible communication, and the other guided by a whole host of personal reasons stemming from individual or family background, emotional ties, professional interest, cultural preferences, intellectual curiosity, to name but a few. For each of these decisions the choice would be as open as possible. As regards language of international communication, we are well aware that most people today would opt for English. However, some could well choose French, Spanish, Portuguese, Mandarin, or any other language (11).

Clearly, the authors are sketching an ideal sociolinguistic situation for a Europe of the future. For citizens, the acquisition of full (spoken and written) fluency in their freely chosen personal adoptive language “would go hand in hand with familiarity with the country/countries in which that language is used, along with the literature, culture, society and history linked with that language and its speakers” (10). This conjures up scenarios of culturally-enriching and self-actualizing travel: “mobility,” yes, but of an ideally voluntary sort. Thus: the Wanderjahr or international residence of the cosmopolitan elites of traditional upper middle-class consciousness. Note here the tilt in the direction of “elite bilingualism,” as opposed to “remedial bilingualism,” the latter a lower-class phenomenon of (e.g., immigrant) assimilation.

“Using this approach,” they write, “we would hope to overcome the current rivalry between English and the other languages, a rivalry which results in the weakening of the other languages and which is also detrimental to the English language itself and its speakers” (10-11).
Explaining the reasoning behind the ‘personal adoptive language’ concept, Sandra Pralong, a member of the High Level Group of Intellectuals on Multilingualism, outlined her vision of “a patchwork of bilateral relations stitching Europe together,” whereby pockets of citizens in each country would learn different languages until all the bloc’s tongues are covered, eliminating the need for a common third one such as English or French (EurActiv 15 Sept 2008).

“The logic of a policy based on a personal adoptive language is that the choice of language would be made in the same way as the choice of a profession,” they write (11-12). Like the idea of travel for personal and cultural enrichment, this evokes a world in which everyone is “free to choose” any “profession” they like, as opposed to being forced to take a “job” in order to survive; here, the personal adoptive language begins to looks like a “lifestyle commodity” akin to any other that confers a certain Bourdivine “distinction.” Above all, the utopian logic of a multilingual Europe “stitched together” out of “bilateral relations” effected through the use of PALs (between “pen-pals”?) is a radically individualized, liberal utopia, in which the language repertoires of individual Europeans smooth out and speed up the circulation of capital and culture.

The spectre of civil strife returns: “To neglect a language is to run the risk of seeing its speakers becoming disenchanted with the European project” the authors write. What is being contemplated here is not the neglect of language(s) by their erstwhile native speakers, who may be under pressure to avoid or compartmentalize the use of their native languages in public in the context of labor migration (or of geographic and economic marginalization, as in the case with many EU “minority” and “endangered” languages), but rather the neglect of languages by EU institutions.

People cannot be expected to be wholeheartedly behind Europe unless they feel that their specific culture, and primarily their language [=MT], is fully respected. … So many of the crises we have witnessed in Europe and elsewhere stem from the fact that a community has in the past felt that its language was not respected; we have to remain careful to head off such feelings from emerging in the years and decades ahead, for they would undermine European cohesion (12).

In this passage, the politics of marginalized groups is reduced to a matter of the “hurt feelings” of individuals (and “communities”)—just as the utopian ideal of a Europe “stitched together” out of pairs of individual speakers who have opted to learn one another’s (European) languages is thought to emerge naturally and cumulatively from their individual choices.

The two sides of the policy idea—bilateralism and personal adoptive language—would, if achieved, be mutually reinforcing and good for social cohesion. And note that vehicular languages have no place in this formulation:

We feel that this policy would be considerably enhanced if everyone could express themselves in a language they are perfectly fluent in, either their own [=MT] or that of their partner [=PAL], rather than, as so often happens nowadays, through the medium of a third language in which they lack that fluency (16).12

Such an arrangement would even be good for English! Here is a way for English to be “de-vehicularized” and returned to the familiar values of a mother-tongue, the better to “retain
and consolidate the eminent place it holds as a language of [British? American?] culture rather than being straitjacketed in the role of instrument of global communication, a flattering but detractive role, and one which is potentially a factor of impoverishment” (15-16). I think this is called *noblesse oblige*.

It is very important to note that the report promulgates quite distinct, separate and unequal sociolinguistic regimes for people born as citizens of EU Member States and for immigrants. While the former would be “free to choose” their personal adoptive language on the basis of “subjective,” personal, family, or other “symbolic” reasons, “for immigrants, the personal adoptive language should in the normal run of events be that of the country in which they have chosen to live” (19). Note the rhetoric of “choice” once more, this time extended to the rather grittier realities of contemporary global labour migration.

At the same time it is important to encourage immigrants to “maintain knowledge of their own language of origin” and teach it to their children (20). “A young person who loses the language of his ancestors also loses the ability to communicate effortlessly with his parents and that is a factor of social dysfunctioning which can lead to violence” (20).

Excessive assertion of identity often stems from a feeling of guilt in relation to one’s culture of origin, a guilt which is sometimes expressed by exacerbated religion-based reactions (20).

It isn’t quite clear exactly whose “exacerbated religion-based reactions” are being alluded to here—those of “Aryan Christians” or skinheads attacking Muslims? Or are we blaming the latter as victims for their very victimization?

Again, the spectre of violence, formulated in psychologistic terms (“guilt feelings”). Note: we are now talking specifically about “young people,” and using the masculine pronoun (“his ancestors”). We are also, of course, talking, albeit in a veiled fashion, about Islam.

To allow migrants, European and non-European alike, to gain access easily in their language of origin and allow them to maintain what we could term their linguistic and cultural dignity, to us once again seems a powerful antidote against fanaticism (20).13

Such measures would “allow” migrants to develop a sense of “linguistic and cultural belonging, not at the expense of religion but at the expense of identity-oriented use of religion, and could help reduce tension in our European societies as in the rest of the world” (21).

Released in September 2008 as part of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, the “Maalouf report” (as it is known in EU circles) is unsettling to read, and reflects a reality that is itself unsettled—recall the bullet-points with which I began, or the fact that alongside the 23 official and working languages of the EU, an estimated 420+ additional languages are now being spoken in Europe.14 The immediate public reception of the report was also mixed,

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13 A useful comparison could be drawn here with the case of Mauritius as described in the recent work of Eisenlohr (2004a, 2004b, 2006), in which such “ancestral languages” have been fancifully stipulated for each ethnic group—except the Afro-Mauritians, whose Creole everyone, as it turns out, speaks.

14 The VALEUR (Valuing All the Languages of Europe) Project of the European Centre for Modern Languages/Centre européen pour les langues vivantes has estimated the number of spoken languages in 21 EU Member States at 440+ (this figure does not include the roughly 18+ sign languages in use across Europe). Nine of these are spoken by more than 100 million people worldwide (Arabic, Bengali, English, Hindi, Japanese, Mandarin Chinese, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish); 24 are spoken by fewer than 1000 people worldwide; 280 are spoken in only one EU Member State. They note that formal instruction is available for approximately 24% of these languages. It is interesting also to note the distribution of languages across 21 EU Member States: Polish
a fact which the UK-based Eurosceptic blog euobserver.com could be expected to amplify. Reporting on a debate organized as part of the launch of the report at which participants explored “whether multilingualism is a bridge or a barrier to intercultural dialogue within the EU,” euobserver quotes in extenso the remarks of Abram de Swaan, an emeritus professor of social science at the University of Amsterdam:

Mr de Swaan said he believes that the complexity of European communication is leading to an impoverished political debate, and, curiously, it is the very usage of a multiplicity of languages that is leading to the dominance of English.

“[Multilingualism] makes it very, very difficult for us to communicate and have a shared public space in which the citizens of Europe can congregate and act out European politics. It’s a damned nuisance,” Mr de Swaan added. “Cultural diversity is guaranteed much more by the free-flowing traffic and the encounters between people in one language community in which they can clash and argue, than by the fact that some people can speak more than one language—and all those languages may basically represent the same culture. The more languages we allowed to flower, the more English will prevail. And that is exactly the present predicament of the European Union” (Küchler 2008).

Continuing its reportage in the “fair and balanced” manner that anyone with experience of US media outlets like Fox News will find familiar, the euobserver gives “the other side” in the debate (under the subhead ‘Adopt’ another language):

Sandra Pralong, a member of the so-called “group of intellectuals for intercultural dialogue” much preferred a multilingual option for Europe, and suggested that every European should “adopt” another language that would be his or her second mother tongue—a key recommendation of her clutch of boffins. Several members of the audience in Brussels however pointed out that the panel was “preaching to the converted”, by promoting multilingualism in the already very international Brussels environment. In the EU capital, thousands of children are schooled in one language, speak to their parents in one or two other languages, have a nanny they address in yet another language and playground friends who speak a whole set of other languages (ibid.).

Though the language in which the multilingual Prof de Swaan delivered his remarks is not identified, the euobserver lavishes fine-grained, almost ethnographic attention on the speech repertoire of EU Commissioner Leonard Orban, who “very much sided with Ms Pralong”:

“Multilingual people act as intercultural mediators and therefore are a precious asset to Europe,” Leonard Orban, the Romanian commissioner for multilingualism said in his own proficient English (ibid.).

The promotion and (eventual) universal acceptance of the Barcelona “Mother-Tongue-plus-two” formula, then, will remake future citizens of the EU in the image of the “pivot-

and German have been reported in use in 17 States; French, Arabic, and Russian in 16 States; Spanish and Turkish in 15 States; Romani in 14 States; and English and Mandarin in 13 States. Full report available at www.ecml.at/mtp2/valeur

15 http://euobserver.com/879/26742
“Languages are one of the most effective tools for achieving intercultural dialogue,” he said, although his comments did seem to concede some of the Dutch academic’s points: “But we must recognise that diversity can also act as a barrier between cultures,” [said] the commissioner, whose native language is Romanian and also speaks French upon request (ibid.).

Mr Orban “gets the last word” in euobserver’s coverage of the event, and here he repeats the language of the report:

“Excessive assertion of identity can lead to intolerance and fanaticism. Accepting linguistic and cultural diversity is a powerful antidote to extremism” (ibid.)

Many of the shortcomings that Susan Gal (2006: 171) has identified in the “common sense view[s] widely held by European elites” are richly in evidence in the Maalouf report: the idea, for example, “that languages are organized systems with centrally defined norms, each language ideally expressing the spirit of a nation and the territory it occupies”; that “monolingualism is the natural or normal condition, both of communities and of individual speakers”; and the idea that linguistic diversity is a matter of neatly bounded entities, separated only “by limits on mutual intelligibility”—along with more significant underlying fears about democracy (Gal 2006: 163).

Viewing certain forms of multilingualism—but not others—as barriers to shared understanding allows EU elites to blame multilingualism—“the people,” in other words—for the dearth of a European public sphere (the “democratic deficit” issue). As Gal points out, the Eurosceptic right and the liberal centre-right are at one in assuming this, even though the former “console themselves with this pessimistic vision,” while the latter “lament” it: “But both sides agree that a major impediment to democratic governance in the European Union is the lack of a public sphere, made impossible by the lack of a single common language in which issues could be generally discussed” (Gal 2006: 175).

And yet the problem, as she points out, “is certainly not linguistic diversity: there is no necessity for a single common (standard) language in order to create a public sphere” (ibid.). Indeed, Inglehart and Woodward demonstrated over forty years ago that “political separatism is not inherent in the existence of linguistic pluralism”; rather, political conflict becomes more likely when speakers’ “social mobility is blocked because of [their] membership in a given language group” (Inglehart and Woodward 1967: 28). What lurks behind this apparent misunderstanding of the relationship between linguistic diversity and political conflict is of course an ideology that remains the very one of the dawn of Andersonian ethnolinguistic nationalism, precisely the post-Enlightenment vision of logocracy sketched by Silverstein (2010). Within the EU today, the response to the crisis is an attempt to reallocate semiotic values to the different elements of a polyglot speaker repertoire in an effort to regiment the indexical value of societal multilingualism, by regimenting the emblematic values attached to languages-in-use.

Noting that the EU does support the work of organizations like the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL), and constantly reaffirms the importance of the “promotion and protection of linguistic diversity”—including “minority and regional diversity.”
languages, foreign, migrant and third country languages; mother tongues, sign languages, lesser used languages, ethnic minority, indigenous and non-territorial languages” (167)—Gal is forced nonetheless to conclude that “this emphasis on linguistic diversity is deceptive.” Why? Because “all the linguistic practices considered worthy of mention conform to standardising and Herderian assumptions: they are named languages with unified, codified norms of correctness embodied in literatures and grammars. No other configurations of speaking are recognized” (167). As Gal notes, “More recent and variously liberal theorists of multilingualism and language rights—from Benedict Anderson (1983) to De Swaan (2001), and Kymlicka and Patten (2003)—all take this standard ideology as their unquestioned, unstated starting point” (167).

“In the attempt to gain recognition, minority speakers within the European regime of national, standard languages have often tried the strategy of making their regional and minority form into standards,” Gal observes. “What are now called—in EU terminology—the minority or regional languages of Europe have all undergone such regimenting steps” (Gal 2006: 170). Again, the post-Enlightenment project of governmentality through logocracy: every “language” worthy of a Volk needs to be made denotationally “ascertained” and “copious,” and at the same time set against all the translation-equivalents of other Völker as an emblem of identity.

Just like standardization, minoritization has the effect of introducing new distinctions and divisions within the “minority language” community itself, for indeed every time a linguistic variety undergoes minoritization, the story of Standardization plays itself out one more time, albeit at a different scale:

a characteristic contradiction of values arises: once certain forms are chosen through language planning as the standard ones, some speakers/users of minority forms become doubly stigmatised. First, from the perspective of the state they are ‘second-language speakers’ of the national language. Second, the speech of minority speakers whose linguistic forms are not included in the new minority standard comes to seem inadequate, and perhaps even inauthentic, from the perspective of that new [minoritized] standard (Gal 2006: 170-171).

So minoritized “languages” are Standards, only on a lesser scale: they have fewer speakers, much less “universality” (or broad usage across social domains), but more “authenticity,” more intense ties to localized, and—this is essential—non-mobile traditions.

Minoritization establishes linguistic difference as the foundation for a new kind of social contradiction, as “the language attitudes of language specialists, intellectuals and media workers come to be at odds with the preferences of other minority speakers … and stark oppositions in language attitudes and interests develop within what was earlier imagined by state agencies and minority speakers themselves to be a unified ethnolinguistic group” (Gal 2006; 171; see Nevins 2004 for a North American example).

On the other hand, becoming “visible” to the State has its drawbacks, insofar as official recognition binds people in relatively disempowered and economically peripheralized communities into a political economy in which “languages such as Saami, Gaelic, and Basque are imagined to have monetary value as exotic markers of place that regional developers hope to sell as touristic destinations” (Gal 2006: 178). The Thatcher government and its New Labour successors, for example, were enthusiastic in their support for the revival of Scottish Gaelic under just these assumptions (McEwan-Fujita 2006).

But note the double-bind: in order to become visible to the State, a “minority” linguistic variety must already have rendered itself legitimate (and worthy of protection) in the only terms the State understands: they must have been “ascertained and liquidated” (their
grammatical forms rationalized to denotational functions) and rendered “copious” in their terminological inventories (for which read: grammar, dictionary, texts; compare Blommaert 2008 on ‘artifactual ideologies’ in the production of distinct African languages). The language and its speech communities must undergo a series of tests, State rituals in which forensic procedures like census-taking and speaker-counting loom large—precisely the structure of the asylum process (Maryns 2005; Blommaert 2009). A petition for official recognition as a regional or minority language of the EU is in fact an application for asylum for a language within the EU supra-state; sovereignty then devolves upon the Member State for administration as a minority within its territorial borders. The obvious irony of the comparison is that these are languages attempting to come in, not from the outside, but from the inside.\footnote{So the metaphor of “domestic dependent foreign nations” becomes very apt indeed—compare the process of Federal Recognition for Native American tribes in the US.}

Border-straddling languages—e.g., Catalan and Basque—create problems, in part because they can’t be “comprehended” as linguistic islands or relic enclaves within the territorial boundaries of a single existing modern state—in a sense, these languages, too, are “mobile” in a way that is discomfiting to the logocratic vision of officialdom.\footnote{Note that both Ireland and Scotland have their own separate respective Gaeltachtai, forming a kind of inner “archipelago”; Gaelic language policy and planning activities have been carried out quite independently in the two states, however (see Ó Ríain 2009 for an overview and comparison).} In a similar way, “vehicular languages” whose use gestures toward mobility between places rather than to rootedness in a particular place, also cannot be fully “comprehended.” What else escapes? The (hundreds of) “new” languages of the “new” Europeans and their offspring and social networks never get a sustained look-in, anodyne pronouncements about the value to Europeans of learning the languages and cultures of newcomers notwithstanding.\footnote{Here again, note that it is mainly the social workers, the NGO resettlement people—the personnel of “remedial bilingualism”—who learn these types of languages to some extent.Again, these strictures do not apply to the Council of Europe.}

Like diasporic communities, erstwhile minority languages whose speakers refuse the implicit injunction to (in the words of Seamus Deane) “stay put, and stay quaint,” simply become invisible.

**Standardizing diversity**


Every modern project of language standardization is founded upon the creation of a contradiction between these two faces or aspects of language: on the one hand, language as an emblem, a symbol of identity and history (‘locality’ in the terminology of Appadurai and ‘historicity’ in the terminology of Stewart 1968); on the other hand, language as a natural communicative medium, a kind of neutral, publicly available social aether in which citizens
are immersed and through which they make contact with one another in acts of communication (‘vitality’).

Having created the contradiction ex nihilo, standardization resolves it, by creating a single linguistic variety as the medium, and the vehicle—through ‘correct’ usage in context—of its resolution. Every modern project of language standardization mobilizes arguments that copperfasten these two aspects of language to each other. Thus, in turn, the contemporary period of EU multilingualism policy attempts to organize European linguistic diversity in terms of them.

Not surprisingly, this same dichotomy animates much of the literature on European multilingualism produced outside of EU/EC institutions. The economist Gazzola, for example (as a researcher at the University of Geneva’s School of Translation and Interpretation, just barely an outsider to EU institutions), makes no distinction between ‘multilingual’ communities and ‘plurilingual’ individuals, “both being defined as referring to the presence or use of more than one language” (Gazzola 2006: 394 fn 3)—but observes that

It is common knowledge that languages fulfill two functions that cannot easily be separated: a communicative function, i.e. the transmission of information in a broad sense, and a symbolic function, associated with cultural and political traits, for example with people’s sense of national identity. Therefore, it is not surprising that the solutions adopted by the EU often represent a compromise between different and contrasting visions about what multilingualism management is (Gazzola 2006: 394).

The project of standardization, to repeat, does separate those two “functions,” even if only in order to unite them, in and through the Standard.

Interestingly, one finds parallel passages elsewhere in the literature, for example the following, from Skutnabb-Kangas:

The mother tongue is needed for psychological, cognitive, and spiritual survival—cultural rights. All the other languages, including the official language of the state in which the children live, are needed for social, economic, political and civil rights. A child must be able to speak to parents, family, and relatives, to know who she is, to acquire skills in thinking, analyzing and evaluating. The mother tongue(s) is (are) vital for this. Further education, job prospects, and the ability to participate in the wider society require other languages. Thus high levels of multilingualism must be one of the goals of proper education (Skuttnab-Kangas 1999: 58).

Skuttnab-Kangas in the passage quoted above joins hands with EU elites in promulgating a fundamental divide that runs through much post-Enlightenment thinking about language(s). Indeed, Hastings and Manning (2004) trenchantly observe in much recent literature “a reductive tendency to read all that is not referential in linguistic function as being expressive of traits of the speaker, that is, identity,” which they observe “produces a serious narrowing of the purview of linguistic anthropology, reducing all of the Jakobsonian functions of language to just two, the referential set towards the object and the expressive set toward the speaking subject,” with these two “often treated as if they were in some kind of uneasy truce, a kind of complementarity” (Hastings and Manning 2004: 296-297). And of course, they note,

his basic antinomic divide that sets off ‘romantic’ expression to objective ‘utilitarian’ reference as authentic private life to alienated public life is realized recursively within the latter. We see this, for example, in different ways of constructing public authority
in language: divisions between an authority of anonymity that downplays the speaker to produce an objective “view from nowhere,” and a frankly expressivist view of language as subjective expression of speakers either as individuals or a Volks collectivity. Within a single subject, these two perspectives produce the opposition between the subject as a public citizen, abstract possessor of universal determinations of a “rights”-based discourse, and as a concrete, private person, possessing particular determinations of an “identity”-based one (Hastings and Manning 2004: 297).

In the materials surveyed here, the principles that underlie the post-Enlightenment project of language standardization are being applied to multiple linguistic varieties at the same time, at two levels: at the societal level, and at the level of individual speaker repertoires. And here is where the dichotomy between the transparency of instrumental value and rational choice and the opacity of emblematic value is resolved in and by the ideal polyglot speaker, who, in addition to his or her mother-tongue, would learn two additional languages: a ‘vehicular’ language “of international communication” out of pure necessity, and a ‘personal adoptive language’ out of pure choice—one for business, and one for pleasure, as the EC’s press release puts it.

While the classical projects of European language standardization fused these two values together, by the magic of the State, in the single national Standard, the current project of standardizing Europe’s linguistic diversity distributes them among (from the individual speaker’s perspective), three distinct linguistic varieties—but not just any three: a repertoire of Urdu, Dutch, and Arabic might not be as beneficial to the speaker as a repertoire like that of Commissioner Orban, who can speak to the international press with ease in Romanian, French, or English, as the need arises.

“When we synthesize case studies of linguistic ideologies,” writes Kathryn Woolard in a recent discussion of language politics in Catalonia, “we find that [linguistic] authority in modern western societies is often underpinned by one of two distinct ideological complexes. I will refer to these as authenticity and anonymity, to capture specific characteristics that arise in discussions of the value of language” (Woolard 2008: 303). Woolard first takes up authenticity:

The ideology of Authenticity locates the value of a language in its relationship to a particular community. That which is authentic is viewed as the genuine expression of such a community, or of an essential Self. Within the logic of authenticity, a speech variety must be perceived as deeply rooted in social and geographic territory in order to have value. For many European languages, these roots are in the mountain redoubts of peasant folk purity (Woolard 2008:304).

“In contrast to minoritized languages, hegemonic languages in modern society often rest their authority on a conception of anonymity” in which “the social roots of the public in any specific speaking position are ideologically represented as transcended, if not entirely absent” (Woolard 2008: 305).

From this viewpoint, the tenets of dominant ideologies in the modern public sphere appear not to belong to any identifiable individuals but rather seem to be socially neutral, universally available, natural and objective truths. In a sense then, they are anonymous. Anonymity is attributed not just to publics but also to public languages.

21 “These are reflexes of the familiar contrast between the universalist ideology that Dirk Geeraerts refers to in this volume as the Rationalist, and the particularist ideology that he refers to as the Romantic” (Woolard 2008: 303).
… Ideally, the citizen participating in public discourse as a speaker of disinterested truths speaks in what we could call a “voice from nowhere” (Woolard 2008: 306).

When we hear someone speaking in the Standard, “we are not supposed to hear the interests and experiences of a historically specific social group. Rather, the language is idealized as a transparent window on a disinterested rational mind and thus on truth itself” (ibid.).

Standard languages uniquely enjoy both of these sources of authority, because the European idea of language standardization itself uniquely invented this distinction between authenticity and universality (or equivalent; compare *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*), positioned the two as mutually contradictory—or evolutionarily predestined—and then resolved the contradiction that it had created. Standardization, thus, creates its own *status quo ante*, often in a way that conflates an evolutionary perspective on social functions and an historical one—a very “nation-state” type of historical consciousness, very like the one described by Benedict Anderson (1983).22

There is nothing inevitable, and certainly nothing universal, about any of this. The literature of anthropology is replete with examples of speech communities outside Europe where language ideological regimes organize the relationship between different enregistered varieties of language according to very different—but no less “arbitrary”—principles: Aguaruna hunter-gatherers in South America in terms of differential amounts of “heat” contained in utterances (Brown 1974), Javanese in terms of gradiently emergent personal qualities of ‘fineness’ (*alus*) and ‘coarseness’ (*kasar*) of participants in interaction (Silverstein 1979, Agha 2007). Examples could be multiplied.

The same dichotomies run through much of the literature on World Englishes (WE), and are front and center in the now-burgeoning literature on “English as a Lingua Franca” (ELF).23 Space does not permit a thorough treatment of these rapidly expanding bodies of work, but one cannot help but notice the impatience of an analyst like Pennycook in the face of “the overly simple view that English is for international communication and local languages for local identities” (Pennycook 2003: 516; citing Crystal 1997), or the same author’s concern about “the rather strange insistence” in the World Englishes paradigm “on the social, cultural, and political neutrality of English” (ibid., p. 518; citing Kachru 1985, 1986), which he sees as leading to “an unhelpful ‘business as usual’ line” (ibid., p. 519).

“Contrary to the common sense view,” then, “standardisation creates not uniformity but more (and hierarchical) heterogeneity,” as Gal points out (171). Not only this: as Catherine Prendergast’s recent study of English in post-Soviet Slovakia shows, standardization begets nothing other than more standardization:

The boom in English instruction in Slovakia was fueled by the search for the English that would meet the newest, the most specific needs of the knowledge-based economy. To stay marketable in the growing field of competitors, English continually had to be “remade.” Niche versions of English proliferated: English for mechanical engineers and English for au pairs, for example, took their place alongside business English promising a quick path to the jobs as auto engineers and domestics for which Slovaks had been pegged. People had to weigh what brand of English to learn (or teach) and had to pursue English as a shifting target. Learning English became as one of my interlocutors put it, a “never-ending story.” (Prendergast 2008: 8)

22 This concept of historicity, as Anderson (1983) showed, was given crucial support by 19th century historical and comparative linguistics (e.g., the “discovery” of Indo-European and of the various sub-families, e.g., Germanic, Balto-Slavic, etc., within it).

Conclusion

Observers and officials alike agree that the sociolinguistic landscape of Europe has been transformed over the past ten or fifteen years. The European Commission (EC) has tried to respond to these changes, establishing an EU Commissioner for multilingualism in January of 2007 and producing a series of policy frameworks, planning documents, opinion polls, white papers, and aspirational statements, some of which have been examined here. In all of these, “multilingualism” is seen as being at the very core of the “European idea”—but also as a potential threat to social cohesion requiring careful “management” by the State.

Top-down efforts to “manage multilingualism” in the EU and elsewhere so as to maximize its benefits and minimize its costs are not without consequences for communities of speakers; in this context, policymakers’ understandings of the nature of multilingualism are of crucial importance.

Policymakers’ understanding of the functioning and internal dynamics of rapidly changing multilingual speech communities—a phrase that after all describes virtually all of the communities that today they are asked to “manage”—is in crisis, in part because of EU expansion, mobility of workers, and rampant developments in ITC, but also because where multilingualism is concerned the thinking of policymakers and European elites more generally is still embedded in what we might call, in a nod to Benjamin Whorf, the “Standard Average European” (SAE) worldview (Whorf 1956 [1939]).

Viewing the transformed—and now “superdiverse” (Blommaert 2003)—sociolinguistic landscape of Europe from inside the standardized languages of the core-EU States, anxiety in these EU/EC documents radiates in three directions, and has three obsessive objects of concern: immigrant languages, regional or minority languages, and vehicular languages (chiefly, English)—these are SAE’s three “constitutive others,” described here in a way that might most trouble the sensibilities of SAE-speaking elites:

1. **Immigrant languages**, as vehicles of “exacerbated religious expressions of identity” in the phrase of the Maalouf report (for which read ‘radical Islam’). Their relative absence from my account here reflects their absence from explicit discussions of EU multilingualism policy (the contrast between the European Commission and the Council of Europe is especially marked in this respect).24

2. **Minority languages** confuse the map of Europe, and become the arena of divisive political struggles (see Herrero-Valeiro 2003 for a fascinating description of the “war of elites” within Galician language revivalism); in EU institutions, fierce and skillful advocacy on behalf of minority languages necessitates complex negotiations—as in 2004, when Spain’s wish to upgrade the EU status of Catalan, Basque, and Galician had to be balanced against Ireland’s drive for full “official” status for Irish (Ireland supported Spain’s proposal), and the willingness of Luxembourg to back off its efforts on behalf of Lëtzebuergesch saved the day (O’Riain 2009).

3. **Vehicular languages**—that is, English, a language sometimes portrayed in the media as a vehicle of US imperialism, of a debased American popular culture, of homogenization, “McDonaldization,” crass commercialism, sexual licence, and/or global warming (take your pick); this is English the “killer language,” the lingua frankensteinia

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24 The Council of Europe continues to recognize and support research, teaching, and program development that takes account of all the languages of Europe, and stresses the human and cultural wealth that newcomers bring with them—see, e.g., the VALEUR (Valuing All the Languages of Europe) program, http://XXX
(Phillipson 2008)—a force that bestrides the world. The immediate problem for EU policymakers is that the young people of Europe are queuing up for English language instruction with all the numbers and enthusiasm of a crowd outside a rock concert.

Indeed, one common thread that connects the three seems to be anxiety and ambivalence toward younger people—which may, again, be rooted partly in demographic realities: the “graying” of the population in the non-migrant communities of core-EU states like France, Germany, and Italy.

EU multilingualism policy is in crisis partly because of the inability of policymakers’ SAE worldview to recognize or comprehend some fundamental and rather obvious facts about language(s):

1. To be the mother-tongue of a group of speakers with a shared history and culture tied forever to a single ancestral homeland is not the only way that a language can summon up, when it is used, a set of “symbolic values.” To speak a linguistic variety that is defined as a “neutral,” nomadic, international or cosmopolitan “instrument” of commerce is to engage with emblematic and “symbolic” values to no less degree—only now values that are associated not with “roots” and fixedness, but with mobility, dislocation, and change. Speakers engage to no less degree with indexical symbolisms or systems of emblematic value when they use a lingua franca than when they use their mother-tongues; the difference is that when they use the lingua franca (whether this be English in Slovakia, or Russian in Estonia), they gesture not toward fixed locations or ancestral homelands, but toward a transnational circuit of mobility, to the very possibility of movement between places (Jacquemet 2005). Is it “the voice from nowhere” or—especially where speaker-centered indexicality is concerned—is it the voice of the “been-to”?

2. English may have been “de-nativised” to the extent that its use (as a “vehicular language”) need not necessarily summon up a stable set of references to and associations with the specific cultural history of its original mother-tongue speakers (e.g., England, the USA, etc.)—but that does not mean that the use of English(es) takes place in a cultural vacuum, or that English-coded utterances carry nothing more in the way of indexical “symbolism” than a signal that the utter-er is oriented to the efficient completion of whatever is the task at hand, as if “taking care of business” were a neutral, transparent activity, with no winners and no losers. “Even being uninvolved … is still tantamount to taking sides, if only because it impacts the two sides to any dispute differently” (Fishman 1994: 69).

3. More specifically, the pernicious idea that English is a neutral “tool of communication” because its use among Europeans (or among any two native speakers of other languages) no longer automatically summons up cultural images associated with England or America belies the obvious fact that whenever two people who both speak

25 Now that empirical research on “English as a Lingua Franca” (ELF) is starting to be done, the picture that emerges is of a remarkably frail and highly variable corporate register in the hands of savvy employees of transnational firms who soldier on through English-coded long-distance telephone conversations to complete the task at hand, gamely ignoring in Stockholm the interlocutors’ many dysfluencies and trusting that he or she, in Egypt, will reciprocate (see the fascinating discussion in Firth 2009). More research on ELF discourse—in less explicitly task-driven situations, and in power-asymmetric (rather than collegial) interactions—will presumably illuminate the actual life of “vehicular English” further.

26 Ireland, for example, is a prime exporter of EFL, primarily to two categories of punters, 3rd-level students from core European countries like Italy and France, and business executives. The trade brings in a much-needed €5 bn to the Irish exchequer each year.

27 See the OED, s.v. been-to: OED: “A term used in Africa and Asia for a person who has been to England, usu. for education.” Here are the OED’s exemplifications: “1960 M. LAURENCE This Side Jordan iv. 82 Who did he think he was, a ‘been-to’ man, educated abroad, like Victor? Ibid. xiv. 251 She was obviously a ‘been-to’, probably trained in England. 1961 Time 3 Nov. 65/1 An educated modern African…sometimes calls himself a Bintu, meaning ‘been to’ Oxford or Cambridge.”
English as a second or nth-language interact, and one of them speaks “better” English than
the other (by whatever measure), a power asymmetry has been established. What counts as
“better English” (or any other *lingua franca*) will of course vary wildly from one context to
another, but “better English” will always be better, for people who want—or, need—to move.

In a knowledge economy in which English is the *lingua franca*, money is to be made
in making communication in English as asymmetrical as possible. Misunderstandings
are certainly part of communication, but another feature of communication is that
some parties have the luxury of being misunderstood while others do not. Similarly,
some parties have the luxury of saying exactly what’s on their mind—of at least
trying to make themselves understood—while others do not. Here is where Slovaks
occupied the downside of asymmetrical acts of communication in the global *lingua
 franca*. Each misunderstanding in English generally bore consequences for them in
terms of lost jobs, lost contracts, lost dignity, or lost political clout, particularly as it
reinforced their position as second-class citizens of the global order. Each of these
misunderstandings simultaneously reinforced the preeminent value of English.
(Prendergast 2008: 9)

Policymakers charged with “managing” European multilingualism have had to cope
with massive sociopolitical and economic and technological change, but these changes were
not developments “external” to language: language use, and the consequences of language
policies, are at the very center of recent developments in (im)migration, communications and
mass-media, and nation-statehood.

Throughout these texts, a fundamental distinction is drawn between *efficiency* in
communication, as something neutral and obvious, and the value of languages as repositories
of identity-affirming *symbolism*—as something obscure and intensely personal, that must be
“respected.” The distinction itself is seen as neutral and obvious, no more controversial than
the contrast between “business” and “pleasure.” Charles Taylor put it this way: “Modern
society, we might say, is Romantic in its private and imaginative life and utilitarian or
instrumentalist in its public, effective life” (Taylor 1975: 541).

But the fact is that “pragmatism” and “principle” will always sit uneasily side by side
until we realize that pragmatism *is* a principle. Mere efficiency and symbolic value will
always contradict each other, until we realize that efficiency *is* a symbolic value.

If, as some have suggested, we are entering a new period of “deglobalization”
following the collapse of world finance capital, this will have profound impacts on linguistic
and cultural diversity both “on the ground” and in the formal institutions (the EU, Member
States, NGOs, schools, social service agencies) that are concerned with it.

Will the rapid retrenchment of formerly “fluid” global capital into havens of security,
alongside the development of new, stricter regulatory regimes and other forms of state
supervision of financial markets, help to bring about the strengthening and further
fortification of the economic and cultural boundaries of nation-states? Among other impacts
on the “real economy,” what might be the impacts of this on the “real ecology” of
communication in Europe? Will the current “re-zoning”—by States—of the virtual world of
global capital help to bring about a concomitant re-zoning of discourse in public spheres, and
of public spaces themselves? What will be the consequences of this for the communicative
horizons and economic life chances of young people, of migrants, of speakers of “regional or
minority languages”? 
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