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Abstract

This paper draws critical security studies into the investigation of language policy for two reasons. First, critical security studies provides informative commentary on how 'security' is now being reconfigured, with developments in digital technology, large-scale population movements, and the privatisation of public services. Second, it is increasingly attentive to how geopolitics permeates the everyday. This generates considerable scope for connection with research on language in society, and this paper provides two case studies of how 'enemy' and 'fear' have been active principles in language policy development. The first shows how security has become an increasingly influential theme in the UK, and focusing on Cyprus, the second describes how legacies of large-scale violent conflict can generate rather unexpected ground-level enactments of language education policy.

Security and war have often been significant influences in language policy, and in the 1940s, the very term 'applied linguistics' sprang from the marriage of Bloomfield's structuralism with language training in the American army (Howatt, 1984, p. 265-9). But according to Liddicoat, "[l]anguage planning studies... have not dealt with security-related language planning in any systematic way. In fact, security is largely absent from most of the classic overviews of language planning" (2008, p. 129). Liddicoat himself surveys the ways in which language planning features in how "states deal with those issues which impinge on questions of territorial integrity and national sovereignty" (p. 130), and he provides a fascinating account of the function and effectiveness of language policies addressing conflict management, conflict prevention and state security needs. However, he also calls for "a more sophisticated understanding of the... conditions, approaches and contexts in [which] the language planning activity is carried out" (p. 148), and argues in conclusion that "[l]anguage planning theory focusing on security ha[s]... tended to focus only on the superficial features of communication without problematising how these superficial features in fact interact with both the context in which they operate and the ends to which they are to be used" (p. 150).

Liddicoate's call for security-related language planning to address context and ideology more fully points towards a wider shift in language policy research (Ricento, 2000). This finds expression in, for example, the ethnographic approach to language policy, which McCarty describes as "processual, dynamic, and in motion... [P]olicy never just 'is', but rather 'does'... We do not restrict our analysis to... official policy declarations and texts... but place these in context as part of a larger sociocultural system... inferred from people's language practices, ideologies and beliefs" (2011, p.). There are also parallels with the 'enactment'

perspective on education policy developed by Stephen Ball et al, who regard policy as “a process, as diversely and repeatably contested and/or subject to different ‘interpretations’ as it is enacted (rather than implemented) in original and creative ways within institutions and classrooms... but in ways that are limited by the possibilities of discourse” (2012, p. 3). And most crucially for the present discussion, there are similarities to a relatively recent strand in security studies which criticises mainstream research on international relations for its idealisation of the sovereign nation-state, for its traditional dislike of “details, local events, or precise and complex life stories” and for its tendency to limit “the thickness of history and anthropology... to a varnish” (Bigo, 2014, p.190, 191). In this perspective, security is not seen as the condition of being safe from external threat. Instead, security involves

a practice of making ‘enemy’ and ‘fear’ the integrative, energetic principle of politics displacing the democratic principles of freedom and justice....
[S]ecurity can thus be understood as a political force. It is not simply a policy responding to threats and dangers. Neither is it a public good or value. It is a practice with a political content. It enacts our world as if it is a dangerous world, a world saturated by insecurities. It invests fear and enmity in relations between humans and polities rather than simply defending or protecting political units and people from enemies and fear. (Huysmans, 2014, p. 3)

In what follows, we will draw on this literature from critical security studies, a heterodox sub-branch of International Relations, for two reasons: first, because it provides a great deal of highly informative description and commentary on the ways in which ‘security’ is being reconfigured within the contemporary world, with developments in digital technology, large-scale population movements, and the privatisation of public services; second, because it is increasingly attentive to the ways in which geopolitics permeates the everyday. Within this literature, there is growing receptivity to ethnography (Goldstein, 2010; Maguire et al, 2014), and just as in much of sociolinguistics now (e.g. Coupland & Jaworski, 2009), practice theory broadly conceived (Ortner, 2006) is a major epistemological influence.

All this generates considerable scope for connection with studies of language in society (Bigo 2016:31), and in what follows, we offer two case studies of how ‘enemy’ and ‘fear’ have been active principles in language policy development. The first shows how security has become an increasingly influential theme in the UK (‘Case study 1’ below), and the second describes how legacies of large-scale violent conflict can generate rather unexpected ground-level enactments of language education policy, focusing on Cyprus (‘Case study 2’). But before that, the next section shows in a little more detail how the notion of security has been elaborated within critical security studies.

Securitisation, the State, Borders and Surveillance: Critical Security Studies

Critical security studies has been strongly influenced by scholars like Foucault and Bourdieu, who have obviously been major influences in sociolinguistics as well. As already noted, security and insecurity are conceptualised as ways of seeing and acting in the world, experiencing relationships infused with fear and hostility, and a similar approach is taken to concepts like the ‘state’, ‘borders’ and ‘surveillance’. The congruence with sociolinguistics and situated discourse analysis can be seen very clearly in the notion of ‘securitisation’.

Securitisation refers to institutional processes that identify threats to the very existence of the state and other bodies, and seek to suspend normal political rights and procedures (Emmers,

2013). With securitisation, a particular group or issue is said to present such a major risk – such an ‘existential threat’ – that it needs to be moved out of the realm of ordinary politics into the realm of exceptional measures. According to Aradau (2004, p. 392), when accounts of securitisation speak of normal politics, they usually refer to the rules of liberal democracy, which can be said to involve (i) a certain degree of political equality and fairness instituted tangibly; (ii) policies and actions as a product of popular power in some tangible sense; (iii) basic procedures which are transparent, open to public scrutiny. By contrast, securitisation aims to

institutionalize... speed against the slowness of [democratic] procedures and thus questions the viability of deliberation, contest of opinion and dissent. While the securitizing speech act has to be accepted by a relevant audience and remains within the framework of the democratic politics of contestation, the exceptionality of procedures is its opposite. The speed required by the exceptional suspends the possibilities of judicial review or other modalities of public influence upon bureaucratic or executive decisions. Securitisation re-inscribes issues in a different logic, a logic of urgency and exceptionalism... the politics of enmity, decision, and emergency. (Aradau 2004, p. 392)

Throughout the processes associated with securitisation, discourse plays a crucial part, both in declaring a particular group, phenomenon or process to be an existential threat, and in persuading people that this warrants the introduction of special measures. In its earliest Copenhagen formulation (cf Buzan & Waever, 2003), the theory of securitisation relied heavily on the speech act theory of Austin and Searle (see Aradau, above), but this limited model of communication has now been extensively criticised in security studies (e.g. Stritzel, 2007), and in an edited collection which seeks to replace this earlier philosophical perspective with a more sociological and pragmatic account, there are references to Sapir, Goffman, Schegloff, Fairclough, Kress, Wetherell, Mey, Duranti and Goodwin (Balzacq, 2011).

Traditionally in the study of politics and international relations, as well as in much commonsense, the state has been seen as a sovereign entity that governs and protects a specified population within a given territory, and it exists alongside others in an international order made of similar sovereign states (Jabri 2007, pp. 41-2; cf Liddicoate, above). But Foucault’s account of the state has become increasingly influential in recent years (e.g. Huysmans, 2006), and instead of seeing it as a monolithic power, this approach sees the state as a plethora of different people, processes, types of knowledge, technologies, actions, arguments etc:

[t]he study of power should begin from below, in the heterogeneous and dispersed micro-physics of power[; it should] explore specific forms of [the exercise of power] in different institutional sites, and consider how, if at all, these were linked to produce broader and more persistent societal configurations. One should study power where it is exercised over individuals rather than legitimated at the centre; explore the actual practices of subjugation rather than the intentions that guide attempts at domination; and recognize that power circulates through networks... (Foucault, 1979, pp. 92-102, 2003, pp. 27-34). (Jessop, 2007, p. 36)

For Foucault, the state is a ‘polymorphous crystallisation’ of these ground-level practices, one of the “broader and more persistent societal configurations” that emerge when these practices are coordinated, through mechanisms and organisations like policy, diplomacy and the

military (Jessop, 2007, pp. 36-37). But the whole assemblage is still rather precarious, and this bottom-up, practice-centred approach to the state complements the account of security sketched above (as well as the perspectives on policy cited in our introduction). It also extends to the crucial issue of borders.

In common sense, borders are viewed as relatively static geographical facts, lines around the perimeter of the territory governed by a particular state. But globalisation makes it increasingly difficult to operate with this definition, and the distinction between inside and outside loses a great deal of its fixity in the activities of the agencies set up to manage state borders. According to Bigo, “we can no longer distinguish between an internal order reigning, thanks to the police, by holding the monopoly on legitimate violence, and an anarchic international order which is maintained by an equilibrium of national powers vis-à-vis the armies and diplomatic alliances” (2008, p. 14). Instead, there is a growing body of ‘security professionals’ engaged in ‘border work’ – police with military status, border guards, customs agents, immigration officers, intelligence officers, private security companies, specialist lawyers, academics and others. Their interests and specialisms form a complicated, interconnected but also relatively disorganised transnational field which often operates outside the auspices of the nation-state, but which nevertheless converges “towards the same figure of risk and unease management, the immigrant” (Bigo 2002, p. 77).

In monitoring who belongs where, who is entitled to stay or visit, who presents what kinds of need, benefit or threat, border work extends well beyond the moment when a person crosses from the territory of one state into another. Security professionals also make increasing use of digital technologies, building risk profiles of individuals and groups with computational algorithms that work on datasets assembled from the information traces left behind whenever people encounter bureaucracy or themselves use digital technologies (Bigo, 2008; Huysmans, 2014; Bauman et al., 2015). And of course it isn’t only migrants who are affected by this surveillance. As matters of routine, most people in the west go on-line, visit websites, use a swipe cards, carry cell-phones etc. For much of the time, the data generated by these swift, convenient and pervasive technologies is used commercially, as a resource for targeted marketing, promoting and monitoring consumption (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000; Bauman & Lyon, 2013; van Dijck, 2013). But these data can also be used to generate a risk profile for someone who wants health cover, insurance or a mortgage, and there is only a thin line between commercial and security surveillance (also Staples, 2014). Admittedly, there is no overall coordination between all the private, state and transnational organisations involved in this surveillance and there is also a good deal of political argument over privacy rights, so that in the view of scholars of security in the west, this doesn’t all amount to *1984*’s Big Brother totalitarianism (Bigo, 2008, p. 11; Bauman et al., 2014). But as Edward Snowden’s revelations show, the US National Security Agency and the UK’s GCHQ collect phone calls, emails, text messages, Skype communications and other data on a massive scale without public consent. Digital intelligence work starts with a particular suspect and then extends to friends of friends of friends. So “for a suspected person with 100 friends at the first hop, the person in charge of surveillance at the NSA or one of its private subcontractors can, without warrant, put under surveillance all 2,669,556 potential connections at the third hop” (Bauman et al., 2014. pp. 123-4).

In this section, then, we have reviewed some core concepts in the study of security. ‘Security’ might sound like a clear-cut condition (safety from threat), just as the ‘state’ might seem like well-defined entity, but in the perspective discussed here, they are viewed as historically specific ensembles of practice and discourse – rationales, knowledges, technologies etc. Similarly, borders might seem like geographical facts remote from most

people's everyday life at home, work or recreation, but the proliferation of security professionals and technologies of surveillance means that almost everyone's routine conduct can have consequences for their mobility, status and entitlements in ways that they don't immediately recognise.

Securitisation, Language and Language Policy

The implications of all this for the study of language in contemporary social life are manifold. For example, in the burgeoning field of linguistic landscape research, analyses of multilingual signage risk a reductive account of the communicative dynamics of space, ethnicity and migration if they neglect the placement, use and effects of CCTV (cf Staples, 2014; Vaughan-Williams, 2008). According to K. Ball, "the experience of surveillance has not yet been addressed in any detail... The fact that individuals sometimes appear to do little to counter surveillance does not mean that surveillance means nothing to them" (2009, p. 640).

Similarly, research on language and superdiversity usually foregrounds (and sometimes celebrates) the challenge that the mobility associated with globalisation presents to established academic and bureaucratic demographic categorisation, but this risks overlooking the flexibility of digital surveillance (Arnaut, 2012; Rampton et al., 2015, pp. 8-10). So for example, "[o]n-line a category like gender is not determined by one's genitalia or even physical appearance. Nor is it entirely self-selected. Rather, categories of identity are being inferred upon individuals based on their web use. Code and algorithm are the engines behind such inference [constructing] identity and category online" (Cheney-Lippold, 2011, p. 165). As "a mode of governing that seeks to quickly adapt delivery of services, control and coercion to changing behaviours deriving and processing information directly from the everyday 'doings' of people" (Huysmans 2014, pp.166-7), the technologies of contemporary surveillance are attuned to the fluidity of identity and the (re)shaping that occurs in interactional practice, even though they are insensitive to the subtleties involved and their interpretations are skewed by their own driving preoccupations.

But what of language policy? In the two case studies that follow, 'enemy', 'fear' and 'security' are central concerns in the contested and uneven unfolding of language policy, but the relationship between ordinary and securitised social relations can be seen moving in opposite directions. Drawing attention to securitisation's growing influence in a liberal democracy, the first concentrates on the UK, where Muslims are increasingly treated as a security risk, where suspicion is articulated with growing force in public discourse, and there are contradictory effects on language policy. The second focuses on Cyprus, where there are now efforts to resolve the long-standing conflict between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, where opportunities to learn Turkish have been introduced for Greek-Cypriots, and where the aftermath of violent conflict generates rather distinctive and unanticipated ground-level enactments of language policy.

Case study 1: The (In)securitisation of Language in Contemporary Britain

As already noted, the work of security professionals tends to converge on "the same figure of risk and unease management, the immigrant" (Bigo 2002, p. 77). The negative portrayal of Muslims is longstanding in Britain, but over the last fifteen years, securitising discourses that abnormalise British Muslims and construct them as a 'suspect community' have intensified.

The term ‘suspect community’ was originally used to refer to Irish people in the UK, suspected of being sympathetic to the IRA (Hillyard, 1993). It refers to

[a] sub-group of the population that is singled out for state attention as being ‘problematic’ in terms of policing, and individuals may be targeted, not necessarily as a result of suspected wrong doing, but simply because of their presumed membership to that sub-group. Race, ethnicity, religion, class, gender, language, accent, dress, political ideology or any combination of these factors may serve to delineate the sub-group (Pantazis & Pemberton 2009, p. 649; see also Huysmans, 2014; Bigo, 2008).

Since 2000, a number of events both in the UK and internationally have resulted in Muslims becoming the primary targets of suspicion. In the summer of 2001, there were riots in three northern English cities involving (mainly Muslim) British Asians, far-right extremists and the police, and these led to calls for more emphasis on citizenship as a way of fusing together ‘parallel communities’ (Cantle Report, 2002). The 9/11 bombings occurred a few weeks later, and the view of Islamic communities as poorly integrated and a security risk became entrenched with the 7/7 London bombings in 2005, where three of the four bombers were born in the UK (Fortier, 2008). In 2007, Glasgow Airport was attacked by two Muslims driving a Jeep packed with petrol canisters into a terminal; in 2013, Fusilier Lee Rigby was murdered in Greenwich by Islamic militants; the Charlie Hebdo murders in Paris in 2015 once again focused attention on an Islamic ‘enemy within’; and more recently, the scale of ISIS’ recruitment of young Muslims willing to leave a comfortable existence in the UK has intensified the portrayal of British-born Muslims as weakly integrated, potentially dangerous, with questionable loyalty.

Over this period, the expression of hostility in public discourse has become much more explicit (see also Cooke & Simpson, 2012, pp. 124-5). ‘Political correctness’ seems to be less of a concern, and the ‘Overton Window’ – the range of ideas and policies that the public is willing to accept – has shifted to the right, as can be seen in, for example, Prime Minister Cameron’s claim that too many Muslims “quietly condone” violent extremism (*Daily Mail* 18/6/15), or in the rise to prominence and acceptability of anti-immigration parties such as the UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party). The public is now told that it is constantly under threat, and this can be seen in the British Government’s *Prevent* policy. In the post 9/11 era, the Government has formulated a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy consisting of four strands. The first, *Pursue* aims to prevent terrorist attacks from happening; the second, *Prevent*, seeks to stop people becoming terrorists; the third, *Protect*, aims to safeguard areas both in the UK and abroad through, for example, stronger border control; and the fourth, *Prepare*, addresses the aftermath of a terrorist attack. *Prevent*, which is both ideological and material in nature, has been by far the most contentious of these strands, and its 2015 guidelines state three objectives:

Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it; prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation that we need to address (HMG 2015, p. 5).

The institutions identified “for partnership with *Prevent*” include local authorities, education from early child care providers to higher education, health services, the prison service and the police (HMG, 2015), and signs of this effort to alert the public to the threat of terrorism are

now unavoidable in everyday life, whether these take the form of classroom surveillance, new measures in airports, or public signage about how to report suspicion. With the *Counter Terrorism and Security Bill (CTS) 2015*, educational institutions are obliged to report any children/individuals who might be being radicalized or ‘at risk’, with Muslim students – children – as potential terrorists and teachers as *de facto* security professionals, who can even receive training for this. Indeed, it was recently reported that

[s]chools are being sold software to monitor pupils’ internet activity for extremism-related language such as ‘jihadi bride’ and ‘YODO’, short for you only die once, ahead of the introduction of a legal requirement to consider issues of terrorism and extremism among children... Several companies are producing ‘anti-radicalisation’ software to monitor pupils’ internet activity, including Impero, which has launched a pilot of its software in 16 locations in Britain as well as five in the US.... A spokeswoman for Impero said:... ‘The system may help teachers confirm identification of vulnerable children, or act as an early warning system to help identify children that may be at risk in future. It also provides evidence for teachers and child protection officers to use in order to intervene in a timely and appropriate manner (*The Guardian* 10/6/2015)

These developments are contested: the 2015 conference of the National Union of Teachers considered the ways in which these developments shut discussion down in school classrooms, making Muslim students fearful that their teachers were undertaking surveillance; in higher education, over 280 academics signed a letter to *The Independent* arguing against *Prevent*’s “chilling effect on open debate, free speech and political dissent” (10/7/15); and the trade union for Further Education and Higher Education stated, “the *Prevent* agenda will force our members to spy on learners, is discriminatory towards Muslims, and legitimises Islamophobia and xenophobia, encouraging racist views to be publicised and normalised in society” (UCU 2015, p. 4). But the ground-level impact of this securitisation of British Muslims is likely to be considerable, and it has also affected language policy, repositioning of languages within policies on citizenship, anti-radicalisation and recruitment for the military and intelligence services.

In the English education system, after extensive multicultural interest in the 1970s and 80s, support for the multilingualism of minority ethnic students declined sharply in the 1990s, making way for a much more exclusive commitment to standard English (Rampton et al., 2001). But the events and discourses sketched above have led beyond this to an intensified emphasis on the need for adult migrants to learn English, and ESOL has been advocated as an essential ingredient in citizenship, an antidote to the ills of segregated communities and a vital instrument of ‘social cohesion’.

As Khan (2015) describes in detail, the 2001 riots were followed by a series of political speeches and policy documents calling for more attention to British citizenship, arguing that to be a citizen is to be a speaker of English (Blackledge, 2005; Cooke & Simpson, 2012, p.125). In 2005, the *Life in the UK* test was introduced for migrants seeking British Citizenship (and for those seeking Indefinite Leave to Remain in 2007), and over time, increasingly demanding English proficiency requirements were tied into this, with, for example, a language requirement being introduced for the reunification of non-EU, non-English speaking spouses in 2011. The spirit of these developments can be seen the words of Home Secretary Theresa May (2015):

Government alone cannot defeat extremism so we need to do everything we can to build up the capacity of civil society to identify, confront and defeat extremism wherever we find it. We want to go further than ever before helping people from isolated communities to play a full and fruitful role in British life. We plan a step change in the way we help people learn English. There will be new incentives and penalties, a sharp reduction in translation services and a significant increase in the funding available for English (Theresa May, Home Secretary, 23/3/15 *A stronger Britain, Built on Values*; at <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-stronger-britain-built-on-our-values>).

Recourse to an interpreter is discouraged here, and arguments like these target other multilingual spaces as well, as evidenced in David Cameron's proposal that "as we develop our Counter-Extremism Strategy... we will also bring forward further measures to guard against the radicalisation of children in some so-called supplementary schools or tuition centres" (Cameron, 2015). Consistent with this, there has been a drop in funding for a number of modern and heritage language courses (Steer, 2014).

Of course policy initiatives of this kind require the involvement of professionals from a range of sectors – immigration, education, city councils, etc – and coordination of the ensemble of people, practices, knowledges and mechanisms that constitute the state is often precarious. Some of the texture of the implementation of these policies is captured in Khan and Blackledge's 2015 account of citizenship in Britain. On the one hand, officials watch the mouths of participants to ensure that they utter the affirmation/oath to become British. At the same time, this gravity can be softened by the conduct of the officers in charge, as noted in Khan's field note:

All the citizens are standing together; they then make the pledge. As they go through the pledge, some are proud and speak clearly and loudly. Some people are a little more reserved and some look plain shy and embarrassed. B [the officiating dignitary] makes a joke: 'we can't speak your language, so we need you to say it in English. Even if understanding English is difficult – do your best.' He then makes the citizens aware that another hurdle remains. He even says: 'I know you have jumped through a lot of hoops, but there is still a hurdle to go.' He then says: 'we'll be watching. Do your best. Try and do your best.' (Khan & Blackledge 2015, p. 399)

The complexities of implementation emerged on a much larger scale in 2014, when Home Secretary Theresa May told the education sector "to put its house in order" and the English language tests for immigration run by Educational Testing Service (ETS) were suspended, following allegations of wide-spread abuse ('fake sitters', and passes guaranteed for £500; *Times Higher Education* 10/2/2014; *Daily Mail* 2014 10/2/2014). And when political calls for English language proficiency as a prerequisite for citizenship coincide with extensive cuts to ESOL and adult education budgets (*Times Education Supplement* 20/7/2015), the counter-extremist emphasis on English for citizenship looks incoherent to the point of self-defeating.

In fact, for the British intelligence and security services, a dramatic fall in the number of students graduating with foreign language degrees gives the multilingualism of the UK's ethnic minority population considerable strategic significance. So in a 2013 response to potential cuts in heritage language qualifications, GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) stated:

We are concerned that there may be a move away from offering qualifications spoken by [minority ethnic] native speakers, as these qualifications not only allow speakers to develop their reading and writing skills and to learn about grammatical structure of their language, but also demonstrate the value of having formally recognised native language skills. We would also support any initiative to increase the number of languages qualifications which cover native speaker or heritage languages (British Academy, 2013, p. 30).

In its recruitment efforts, GCHQ has undertaken outreach work in schools, and in a similar vein, the British Army has made a concerted effort to recruit more Muslims, not just because of its diversity targets but also for their linguistic skills (British Academy 2013; Carter 2015). The difficulty is, of course, that just at the time when intelligence and the military want their linguistic abilities more than ever, Muslims are being portrayed as a ‘suspect community’, subjected to high levels of surveillance, scrutiny and distrust (Khan, 2015).

So as an element in securitization, language policy is no more coherent or unified than other aspects of this process. Even so, security concerns are far more prominent in the discourse and enactment of domestic language policy than they were at the end of the 20th century, and we could not understand these developments if security was simply conceptualised as protection from a clearly identified external threat, as in traditional International Relations research. Increasingly, cultural and linguistic difference has itself been constructed as a security risk, and in the everyday lives of many people with Muslim, migrant, diasporic and/or multilingual backgrounds, this can be characterised as a process of *insecuritisation*, of being watched by a growing number of people pushed into the role of ‘security professional’, becoming increasingly vulnerable to ‘exceptional measures’ (Bigo, 2008; 2014, pp. 198-202). And of course this isn’t restricted to the UK. In the study of a town in Pennsylvania with a large community with links to Mexico, Gallo describes the enactment of ‘Secure Communities’ from 2011 onwards:

‘Secure Communities’ is a data sharing program in which local police officers submit a person’s information to Immigration and Custom’s Enforcement (ICE) when a person is stopped for any infraction, ranging from an arrest for an aggravated felony to a minor infraction such as a speeding ticket (Kohli, Markowitz, & Chavez, 2011). If this person does not have documentation for U.S. residency, he or she can be apprehended by ICE and undergo the deportation process (2014, p. 477).

Ninety per cent of those deported are not released from detention prior to deportation, often not having the chance to say goodbye to their families (2014, p. 490), and Gallo describes in detail the traumatic effects on children and community (as well as the difficulties that schools hamstrung by test-oriented curricula have engaging with this) (Gallo & Link, 2015; de Genova, 2002).

Rather than highlighting political currents that are becoming more significant in liberal democracies, our second case points to a gap between the expectations of language policy in peace and stability, on the one hand, and on the other, the practices observed in environments where security has been a long-standing concern.¹

¹ The discussion draws on findings from two periods of linguistic ethnographic research focused on Turkish-language classes organized in Greek-Cypriot schools and adult institutes (2006-2009; 2012-2015). For a succinct overview, see Rampton et al (2015).

Case study 2: De-securitisation and Foreign Language Education in a Conflict-affected Context

In the Council of Europe's *Common European Framework of Reference for Languages*, foreign language education is generally assumed to contribute to peaceful coexistence. But what happens to dominant assumptions in a well-established field like this when teaching takes place in a conflict-ridden or post-conflict setting where the language taught is associated with people who have been portrayed for many years as a threatening enemy?

Cyprus has a long history of interethnic conflict between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities, going back to the beginning of the 20th century. In an era of intense nation-building in both Greece and Turkey, the island's two main religious communities, Christians and Muslims, came to imagine themselves as incompatible 'Greeks' and 'Turks' under the influence of antagonistic nationalist discourses (Bryant, 2004). A bi-communal Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 but in spite of this, interethnic violence broke out between 1963-67, and in 1974 the political turmoil culminated in a military intervention by Turkey that left the island *de facto* divided into a (Turkish-speaking) north and a (Greek-speaking, government-controlled) south. Since then, a buffer zone patrolled by military personnel and UN peacekeeping forces has served as a physical border that separates the two communities and substantially inhibits communication between them.

Language played a crucial role in the historical development of these ethnic identities in Cyprus. It served as a tangible way of differentiating the population into two communities and was perceived as a precondition for their survival (Karoulla-Vrikki, 2004; Kizilyurek & Gautier-Kizilyurek, 2004). At earlier points in history, Turkish-Cypriots (the minority) used both Turkish and the local Cypriot variety of Greek, but during the conflict, nationalist discourses on both sides not only discouraged but also penalised bilingualism (Ozerk, 2001; C. Charalambous, 2012). Speaking the language of the national 'archenemy' (Papadakis, 2008) became undesirable and a sign of betrayal. So Turkish never featured in official Greek-Cypriot educational curricula, and learning the language was largely restricted to Greek-Cypriot police and intelligence services (Papadakis, 2005).

In 2003, however, after 29 years of total isolation and 'ethnic estrangement' (Bryant, 2004), in the midst of negotiations for Cyprus' entry to the EU and the search for a political settlement of the Cyprus Conflict, the Turkish-Cypriot authorities announced the partial lifting of the restrictions of movement across the buffer zone and for the first time, people were allowed to cross the dividing line. Language was also drawn into a central role in this period of rapid political developments: just a week after the opening of the buffer-zone checkpoints, the (Greek-)Cypriot government announced the establishment of language classes for Greek-Cypriots wishing to learn Turkish as Foreign Language, both in secondary schools and adult institutes, as well as classes for Turkish-speaking adults who wanted to learn Greek.² In educational documents, in interviews with senior ministry officials, and among many people who decided to attend the classes, these initiatives fitted into a rhetoric of reconciliation and were seen as an emblematic gesture of government good will (see Charalambous, 2012, 2013, 2014).

² For Turkish-Cypriots the language classes were only offered in afternoon governmental institutions, as schooling in both communities has been historically separate.

On the ground, though, things were more difficult, as the setting up of Turkish classes was not accompanied by an immediate change in educational and public discourse, which continued to construct Turks as the enemy posing an imminent threat to the Greek-Cypriot community (see Adamides, 2014). As a result, teaching and learning Turkish was often seen as threatening Greek-Cypriot education's Greek-centred – 'Hellenocentric' – orientation. For Turkish FL teachers and learners, this generated a series of practical complications. In our 2006 study (see C. Charalambous, 2012), almost all interviewees reported being called a 'traitor', a 'Turk' or 'Turkophile' by peers, friends and occasionally by family members and other teachers, and as a result, they often hid their Turkish books, avoided mentioning the classes they taught or attended, and/or developed careful justifications in defence.

Formulated in terms from security studies, the lifting of border restrictions and the introduction of Turkish classes can be seen as *de*-securitising moves. Rather than seeking to shift a group from the sphere of ordinary politics into a zone of exceptional measures (securitisation), de-securitisation pushes in the opposite direction and seeks to normalise relations with what has hitherto been seen as an existential threat (cf P. Charalambous et al., 2015; Aradau, 2004). But this involves discursive struggle and resistance, and analysis of the enactment of Turkish FL policy in Cyprus points to practices and stances that challenge mainstream applied linguistic accounts of foreign language education, thereby relativising them, while also suggesting unanticipated ways in which language education can contribute to processes of reconciliation.

In a great deal of the theory underpinning FL policy, lessons are seen as occasions for practising communication, with a view to engaging with speakers of the foreign language outside class. Role-plays and materials with a degree of resemblance to the everyday world inhabited by the FL speakers are often recommended ('authenticity'), and in recent years, there has been increased emphasis on students developing inter-cultural competence, the capacity to understand and manage cultural differences (Council of Europe, 2001; Byram et al., 2001). But in the de-securitisation process in Cyprus, Greek-Cypriot society was itself engaged in a still highly contested process of negotiating whether and how to move Turkish issues *into* the realm of ordinary civic life, *out of* the exceptional measures required for an existential threat. So for many Turkish language students, imagining oneself in the world of the target language was far from straightforward. A number of secondary students told us that they had no intention of ever talking to a Turkish-speaker, and as one teacher complained, "how am I going to practice dialogues in the classroom between sales-men and buyers, when students are not supposed to cross to the other side and buy things from the occupied territories" (fieldnotes, 2006). Indeed, if a teacher made a positive comment about Turkish-speaking people even in passing in the classroom, this could spark intense reactions and at least momentarily jeopardise their authority, as C. Charalambous (2013) documents in detail.

So how did teachers cope? They developed several strategies, but the most common was to treat Turkish as just a lexico-grammatical code. Instead of emphasising the communicative and cultural aspects of the language, encouraging learners to "cope with the affective as well as cognitive demands of engagement with otherness" (Byram, 1995, p. 25), a lot of teachers tried to suppress the socio-indexical/socio-symbolic side of Turkish, and instead, they presented it in class as a neutral set of lexical items and syntactic structures. Of course there is a strong philological tradition that supports pedagogy like this, but these teachers were quite explicit about the risks of attempting a communicative or intercultural approach (P. Charalambous et al., 2015). Their 'de-culturalisation' of Turkish, in other words, was driven by acute cultural sensitivity.

And what of the young people? Why did they choose Turkish in the first place? ‘Because it’s easy and gets you good marks’ was one of the most common answers provided in interview, and liking a particular teacher also played a part. But this oversimplifies the experience of learning the language of an enemy, and for a fuller understanding, it is important to look beyond the usual unit of analysis in the study of foreign language learning motivation – the individual – and to situate learners in their families and family histories. In violent conflicts of the kind experienced in Cyprus, collective life is profoundly disrupted, with widespread loss of life and a great deal of forced relocation (Greek-Cypriot refugees moved south, and Turkish Cypriots fled north). After the cessation of hostilities, the language of the enemy – in this case, Turkish – is likely to be bound up with lived, learned and taught histories that are vividly remembered, indexing a set of experiences and relationships about which families still have very deep feelings. So to grasp how adolescents positioned themselves as learners of Turkish, we had to understand their intergenerational family relationships, and it was clear in interview that family discussions could either constrain or enhance their scope for studying the language. Family losses, anger and pain produced visible reservations among some learners, who worried about venturing too far with things Turkish, while for others, more positive family experiences in the pre-1974 period before the war – stories of friendship, collaboration and exchange with Turkish-Cypriots – contributed to greater engagement, gradually reworking the negative associations of Turkish, often in continuing dialogue with older family members. In sum, secondary school students participated in these classes as the younger members of multi-generational families, balancing loyalty and responsibility to their kin with an awareness of geo-political processes increasing the possibility of reconciliation. So here and more generally in post-conflict situations, an analysis that follows the usual route of focusing only on the motivation, aspirations and choices of individuals is likely to be insufficient.

In the mainstream paradigm, FL teachers prepare their students for visits abroad to the country where the language is widely spoken, but the situation was much more complex in Cyprus. While the political situation remained officially unsettled in the island, crossing to the other side was often treated as morally unacceptable. For some, the act of passing through a checkpoint gave recognition to an imposed dividing line which they regarded as illegitimate, bringing accusations of betrayal; some crossed occasionally but avoided economic transactions as a matter of principle; and others crossed more frequently and had ongoing relationships with people in the north. These differences were experienced among both adults and adolescents, and in the adult classes they were quite often acknowledged and discussed. When adults and adolescents did cross to the north, their perspective was also radically different from the ‘touristic’ gaze most commonly assumed in FL (e.g. Sercu & Bandura, 2005). Instead, especially among adolescents, accounts of visits to the Turkish-speaking north often carried the aura of *pilgrimage*, and they were formulated as ‘narratives of return’, either to their parents’ former home in the case of students from refugee families, or to places emblematic of Greek Orthodox identity. Indeed, even when talking about Istanbul in class, teachers tended to highlight its Greek roots, history and character. In sum, locating the ‘target language’ in time and space always bore the stamp of a troubled past, and it was far more difficult in these Turkish classes than is usually assumed in discussions of FL education (Charalambous, 2013).

Admittedly, in defence of orthodox FL education theory, one might argue that given the long history of Turkish in Cyprus, it is a mistake to call it a ‘foreign’ language. But this was the categorisation used by the Greek-Cypriot education authorities, who placed it alongside Italian, French, Russian and other languages in the secondary curriculum. Moreover, there is

a case for saying that its very position as an everyday curriculum subject, as just one among a number of FLs, made a significant contribution to the reconciliation process. As we have said, it was very hard to normalise relations between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots because it ran counter to the historic securitisation of Turks and Turkish-Cypriots. But for this, the very ‘ordinariness’ of the foreign language class was itself a resource. Curricular foreign language learning is an unspectacular but long-term, widely-established, institutionally organised activity that demands a significant investment of time and effort, and these Turkish language classes meant that Greek-Cypriots regularly shared a space where things and practices linked with Turkish had a low-key presence close at hand, travelling back and forwards between school and home in homework bags, accessible for closer association if students wanted and were able. According to Aradau (2004), effective de-securitisation in a liberal democracy needs to restore the “possibility of scrutiny as well as the expression of voice”, practices that securitisation suppresses. To achieve this, it requires a “*slowness* in procedures that ensures the possibility of contestation” (p. 393; our emphasis), and “a different relation from the one of enmity... has to be *inscribed institutionally*” (p. 400; our emphasis). Slowness and institutionalisation were intrinsic to these Turkish classes. They brought people into the vicinity of otherness as a matter of routine (a teaching period twice a week for one or two years in the secondary curriculum) and they occupied their attention over periods of time that were long enough to host small and gradual shifts in outlook. Such shifts were, of course, far from guaranteed, but there was good evidence that Turkish lessons helped a number of students orient more constructively towards a peaceful future.

Unfortunately, this has not yet been recognised by the Greek-Cypriot education authorities, which, in an educational reform that is still ongoing, have decided to discontinue the provision of Turkish in the secondary curriculum, together with all foreign languages other than English and French, justifying this by saying that two years is not enough to learn a language properly, implying that time could be better spent on other subjects. In other words, Turkish teaching at secondary school is being judged by the same criteria most commonly applied in FL education – the development of linguistic proficiency – even though the historical background of intense conflict meant that the working assumptions about communication, culture and the person in time and space were very different from those operating in a Greek-Cypriot class of Spanish or Italian.

From research like Pavlenko’s comparative account of foreign language education in the war-oriented USA and Soviet Union (2003), Uhlmann’s study of Arabic classes for Jewish school students in Israel (2010; 2012), and Karrebaek and Ghandchi’s description of mother-tongue Farsi in the divided Iranian refugee community in Copenhagen (2015), it is clear that the Cyprus case isn’t actually unique, and that when there are circumambient discourses of security and/or serious conflict in the background, the ‘target’ culture may be excluded in culturally responsive language classrooms, along with anticipations of casual contact and tourist travel. To get proper recognition from policy actors, perhaps the vocabulary of language policy and pedagogy needs a new category capable of changing these expectations of success, such as ‘troubled’ or ‘conflicted heritage language’. But of course policy enactment entails much more than just conception and design, and a formulation like ‘troubled/conflicted heritage’ could undermine the low-key ordinariness of curricular Turkish-as-a-foreign-language that seemed to help students along the path from hostility to toleration (or beyond).

Conclusion

In this paper, we have pointed to methodological compatibilities between ethnographic approaches to language policy on the one hand, and critical security studies on the other, both being grounded in a broadly based theory of practice. We began by describing the ways in which critical security studies is reconceptualising traditional concepts from International Relations like ‘the state’, ‘security’, ‘borders’ and ‘surveillance’, and we suggested that in the process, linguistic ethnography becomes a potentially very valuable analytic resource. In addition, the interaction between sociolinguistics and critical security studies is warranted by the fact that over the last twenty years or so in parts of the west, issues of (in)security have gained much wider currency in both public and everyday discourse.

We illustrated this with a case study from the UK, showing how security policies are licensing and normalising new forms of racism, redefining the responsibilities of professionals, working through into new forms of monitoring, respecifying of the goals for language education. But at the same time – and in line with what policy ethnographies and critical security studies would both lead one to expect – we also saw that these processes were neither uncontested nor especially coherent.

Of course, in many places elsewhere, large-scale conflict can have a very prominent, wide-ranging and long-standing impact on social life, and in the second case study, we turned to Cyprus, where teaching the language of the former enemy has featured in the (Greek) Cypriot government’s attempts to bring the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities closer together. Here we focused on the ground-level enactment of a ‘de-securitisation’ policy, and we found language pedagogies that were hard to square with the orthodox theory and practice of intercultural communicative language teaching, even though they were very sensitively tuned to the possibilities at that particular time and place.

In fact more generally, war, insecurity and the legacies of violent conflict have featured in a number of different ways in studies of language and society (C. Charalambous et al., 2015). Close to front-line military conflict, there are accounts of language policy and communicative practice in, for example, intelligence gathering, translation and interpreting, language instruction, and allied personnel coordination (see Footit & Kelly, 2012; Liddicoat, 2008). At one or more removes from the conflict itself, with enemies and experiences of violence looming in the background instead, there is significant work on language and discourse in asylum procedures and language pedagogy in settings receiving refugees (e.g. Maryns, 2006; Karrabaek & Ghandchi, 2015). There is also research on teaching and learning the ‘language of the enemy’ (see the last paragraph in the section above), as well as language policy during and after conflict (Pavlenko, 2003; Busch, 2010). But for the most part, these studies lie outside the mainstream of applied and sociolinguistic research, and might be regarded as peripheral to discursive life in the polities in which they are conducted.

However, with a sense of geo-political instability growing in many places, it is likely that ‘enemy’ and ‘fear’ will become increasingly powerful elements in politics, policy and everyday institutional life, often “displacing the democratic principles of freedom and justice” (Huysmans, 2014, p. 3). As we have emphasised, the effects are unpredictable, and the changing configurations of security agent, threat, suspect, technology, policy and communicative practice will need to be identified and described empirically. The terms ‘securitisation’, ‘insecuritisation’ and ‘desecuritisation’ provide only a hint of the different ways in which ‘security’ and language policy are likely to be related in the period ahead, but as a key resource for future investigations, there is an invaluable body of expert literature in

critical security studies, which stands out for its compatibility with practice-centred language policy research.

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